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Zusammenfassung: 
In den gegenwärtigen Diskussion um den Migrations-Entwicklungs-Nexus werden 
Ressourcenflüsse aus dem ›Norden‹ oder ›Westen‹ in den ›Süden‹ oder ›Osten‹ in der Regel 
als Einbahnstraßen dargestellt. Die dabei erwähnten Transfers betreffen finanzielle 
Rücküberweisungen von Migranten, Humankapital, Wissen und sogar »soziale 
Rücküberweisungen«, also zum Beispiel den Export von Ideen wie Demokratie, 
Geschlechtergleichheit und Menschenrechte. Wie schon in den Vorgängerdebatten in den 
1960er und 1980er Jahren wird auch die heutige Debatte durch die Zivilreligion 
›Entwicklung‹ und institutionell durch Entwicklungskooperation gerahmt. Allerdings 
erscheint aus einer grenzübergreifenden Perspektive – einer transnationalen Sichtweise – die 
Ressurcentransfers nicht als Einbahnstraße, sondern als Verkehr in beide Richtungen. So 
lassen sich etwa massive Ressourcenflüsse in die umgekehrte Richtung beobachten. Beispiele 
sind etwa der Verlust an Gehirnen (brain drain) oder Studiengebühren von internationalen 
Studierenden aus sog. Entwicklungs- oder Transformationsländern, die Universitäten in den 
OECD Ländern zufließen. Um Transfers in beide Richtungen genauer zu beschreiben und die 
dabei involvierten Mechanismen zu verstehen, können sowohl Ansätze aus der 
Transnationalisierungs- als auch der Tansnationalismusforschung genutzt werden. 
 
 
 
Public debates and research on the two-way relationship between migration & development—
the migration-development nexus—has increased considerably over the past years. To be 
more precise, it has experienced yet another climax after two previous ones, in the 1960s and 
1980s. Yet there is very little systematic thought given to what is ‘new’ around this time. I 
argue that the current debates around the migration & development nexus should be 
approached from a transnational angle, that is, looking at the emergence of a new 
transnational agent in development discourse—intermittently called ‘migrants’, ‘diaspora’, or 
‘transnational community’. Increasingly, the cross-border ties of geographically mobile 
persons and collectives are taken to the centre of attention. And national states, local 
governments, inter- and supranational organisations and development agencies seek to co-opt 
and establish ties to such agents who are engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border 
relationships on a personal, collective and organisational level. Also, and this is crucial for 
any kind of scientific endeavour, the emergence of this new type of development agent can be 
tackled by a decidedly transnational methodology. Only then can we hope to look at what is 
usually called ‘development’ in both North and South. What this could mean in terms of 
concepts and research strategies is open for debate at our conference. In short, the starting 
hunch of this conference is that instead of repeating the ‘new mantra’ (RATHA 2003) of 
migration and development, which is simply a retake of previous debates in familiar terms, it 
is useful to engage in two activities: first, to question the significance of the current debates, 
their economistic bias and their disjointed nature when it comes to North and South; and 
second, to explore opportunities for a methodologically more sophisticated approach to 
transnational linkages. 
 
 
What are the Elements of the ‘New Enthusiasm’? 
The new enthusiasm around migration and development hinges on a number of strong claims 
which in turn raise serious questions. What are these claims? They can be summarized in the 
statement that the flows of money, knowledge and universal ideas—called remittances—can 
have a positive effect on what is called development. Obviously, this is not a new insight and 
a retake of familiar debates which have been on the public and academic agendas on and off 
since the 1960s. The first claim is that financial remittances carry a huge potential for poverty 
reduction and local investment, especially since remittances very often are resistant or even 
counter-cyclic to economic recession. The amount of remittances transferred to developing 
countries flowing through officially sanctioned channels such as banks or money transfer 
services are estimated to have increased sharply over the past years—at $167 billion for 2005, 
up from about $40 billion in 1990 (IOM 2005: 270). This is at least double the sum of the 
OECD’s annual Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Second, despite the fact that 
financial remittances still stand at the core, in this new round of enthusiasm, indeed euphoria, 
more emphasis is placed on the transfer of human capital and social ideas & practices from 
North to South. Now the perception of costs and benefits have changed with shifts in ideas, 
from ‘brain drain’ in the 1970s to ‘brain gain’ in the 1990s. Nowadays, we supposedly find 
more win-win situations for mobile persons, states and others. And even newer is the concept 
of ‘social remittances’, the flow of ideas and practices which are ‘good’ and to which nobody 
in his or her right moral mind would object: human rights, gender equity, and democracy—to 
name only the most obvious ones. Third, part of the “new mantra”—it has to be repeated a lot 
to be believed—is the desirability of temporary labour migration because of the hope that 
temporary migrants transmit a higher percentage of their income than permanent immigrants. 
This view has especially been propounded by KOFI ANAN’s Global Commission on 
International Migration in its 2005 report (GCIM 2005), which was given visibility by the UN 
High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006. Overall, these three broad 
 
optimistic claims are tied to migration control. It is the hope expressed by political institutions 
such as the EU Commission that, on the long run, economic growth supported by financial 
and partly knowledge and social remittances will reduce ‘migration pressure’ in the sending 
countries (EU Commission 2005). 
 
Yet, even a cursory glance at this new enthusiasm raises a number of obvious questions which 
cast doubt on this optimistic agenda, relating to two sets of questions. 
 
First, the question is what is new and what is old about the new mantra on the migration-
development nexus. Actually, after decades of research there is a consensus on the 
consequences of migration on development, at least among economists: whilst the economic 
impacts for receiving countries, mostly OECD states, are ‘clearly positive’, for sending 
countries the benefits are less clear-cut and heavily contested. And most studies conclude that 
development in the countries of origin is not a result of migration and remittances and 
investments by migrants. Instead, development—or the right institutional conditions—is a 
prerequisite for migrants to invest and to meaningfully remit. These results have been 
repeated over and again. Therefore, there is a dire need to historicize the discourses on the 
migration-development nexus. 
 
Second, as to sustained cross-border transactions the question comes up whose transnational 
ties and what kind of transnational ties are good for development? Lately, terms such as 
‘diaspora’ and ‘transnational communities’ are not only used by scholars, politicians and 
bureaucrats in both emigration and immigration regions. But apparently, some transnational 
transactions are usually seen as negative in public discourse. Just think of fundamentalist 
Muslims who do not want to become ‘like us’, or think of refugee or diaspora warriors who 
want to establish new states by force. This is also the case for return migrants in regions such 
as Latin America or South Asia. For example, women return migrants may be perceived as 
threats to established patriarchal orders when claiming to acquire property and earn their own 
income (DANNECKER 2004). In short, the new enthusiasm overlooks the renegotiation of 
boundaries and political conflicts associated with transnational transactions, such as class, 
professional, ethnic and gendered hierarchies. In order to do so, we need to take a closer look 
at the prospects of taking a transnational angle and deliberate transnational methodology. 
 
 
What is ‘old’ and what is ‘new’? The History of Thinking on the Migration-
Development Nexus 
Taking a time frame of about 50 years, the fundamental claims associated with the new 
migration-development enthusiasm are not so new. From a simple cost-benefit point of view 
the basic idea says that the flow of emigrants and the loss of brains are partly or wholly 
compensated by a reverse flow of money, ideas and knowledge. 
 
The following three phases of the nexus can be distinguished (cf. THOMAS and ZNANIECKI 
1927 for earlier conceptualizations). It is interesting, yet not surprising, that the 
conceptualization of the nexus between migration and development mirrors the dominant 
economic development paradigms; economics being the leading and most conspicuous 
discipline in conceptualizing development. 
 
Phase 1: Migration and Development—Remittances and Return 
In phase 1 during the 1960s public policy emphasized the ‘labour gaps’ in the North and 
‘development’ in the South. The latter was supposed to result from financial remittances, 
 
return migration and the subsequent transfer of human capital (KINDLEBERGER 1967). This 
view clearly corresponded to overall economic modernization concepts and to a belief that 
state capacity could shape economic growth. Moreover, it was congruent with the economic 
textbook mantra which suggests that emigration of surplus labour from underdeveloped areas 
leads to a new equilibrium between capital and labour (cf. LEWIS 1954): If labour goes North, 
labour scarcities in the South then create inflow of capital—and eventually economic 
development in the South (cf. HAMILTON and WHALEY 1984). 
 
Phase 2: Underdevelopment and Migration—Poverty and Brain Drain 
In phase 2 during much of the 1970s and 1980s the term development came to be replaced by 
‘dependency’ as a structural condition of the periphery dominated by a centre, and 
‘underdevelopment’ as its inevitable result. This period, in which dependency theory and later 
on world systems theory à la IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN criticized modernization theory 
(WALLERSTEIN 1974), the nexus was partly seen the other way around in terms of assumed 
causality, not from migration to development but from underdevelopment to migration (for an 
example, see PORTES and WALTON 1981). In terms of public policy, one of the central issues 
was not financial remittances—remember that most European countries stopped recruitment, 
closed their main gates and kept only side doors open for selected categories in the 1970s and 
1980s—but the issue of ‘brain drain’. In a dependency perspective underdevelopment led to 
the loss of highly-skilled who migrated from the periphery to the centres in the dependent 
world and above all into industrialized countries. This out-migration, in turn, was thought to 
contribute to even more underdevelopment and increased migration flows through 
asymmetric distribution of benefits and resources (cf. MARTIN 1991). Evidence for this thesis 
is easy to spot, also nowadays. For example, in 2005, between a third and half of the so-called 
developing world’s science and technology personnel lived in OECD countries. And it is 
almost needless to say that a differentiated view of the movement of brains indeed has proven 
such “brain strain hotspots” (LOWELL et al. 2004), such as the health care sector in Sub-
saharan Africa, while countries developing quickly along economic lines, such as Taiwan, 
South Korea and the People’s Republic of China, could change the situation into “reverse 
brain drain” (ZWEIG 2006). 
 
Phase 3: Migration and Co-development—The Celebration of Circulation 
In phase 3, since the 1990s, the idea of what in French has been called co-développement best 
describes the public policy approaches of immigration countries to the migration-development 
nexus, at least those propagated by several states such as France, the Netherlands, the UK and 
international organisations such as the World Bank. Originally the term described local level 
development activities but soon came to encompass a broader migration-development 
strategy. The term co-development connotes a reversal of the nexus and has led us back to a 
more optimistic view, akin to the 1960s. International migration is supposed to fuel 
development in South and East—the ‘Global South’—this time not only via financial 
remittances and human capital, but knowledge flows more generally and social remittances 
(MAIMBO and RATHA 2005): There seems to be a belief that more circulation of labour fosters 
more development by the way of remittances, hence the policy recommendation of the Global 
Commission to increase opportunities for short-term labour migration (GCIM 2005). 
 
As this short sketch suggests, different directions of causality within the migration-
development nexus were emphasized in the three periods mentioned. 
Interestingly, none of these discourses took note of the most obvious linkage, namely the 
well-established economic relationship between economic development and migration, that is, 
that processes of Western-style industrial-economic development are usually being 
 
accompanied by emigration as a sort of inevitable by-product (FAIST 2000: 160 – 162). Quite 
to the contrary, economic development, as measured in conventional terms such as growth in 
GDP, is likely to produce even more migrants on the short- and mid-term. 
 
 
What is New? Migrants as Transnational Agents—Transnational Methodology 
While in phase 1 just mentioned policymakers and analysts only could think of remittances 
and return migration as a way of transferring resources across borders, in the third period the 
landscape of alternatives has widened in an era called globalization, network society, or world 
society—an era of ever-increasing circulation. All of the new terms such as co-development 
point to the emergence of new transnational agents, that is, ‘diasporic’ actors. Underlying this 
semantic change is the hunch that migrants and geographically mobile persons and those with 
whom they associate may be engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border practices. So 
the story is not simply about migration and development—but about transnationalisation. 
 
Various agents have repositioned themselves locally in the global changes since the late 
1980s. Both public policies and rhetoric changed. A prominent example for the transformed 
political semantics is the discursive and institutional changes the People’s Republic of China 
has implemented. Discursively, the slogan to “serve the country” (wei guo fuwu) replaced the 
previous motto of “return to serve” (huiguo fuwu) (CHENG XI in NYÍRI 2001: 637). Such 
rhetoric has been complemented by public policy changes. Again, examples are easy to spot, 
including adaptations through mechanisms such as dual citizenship for emigrants and 
immigrants (FAIST 2007), voting rights for absentees, tax incentives for citizens abroad, and 
cooptation of migrant organisations by local, regional and state governments for development 
cooperation. Instead of permanent return migration, temporary returns, visits and other forms 
of transactions have moved to the centre of attention. Thus, in recent years the notion of 
migrants’ return as an asset of development has been complemented by the idea that even if 
there is no eventual return, the commitment of migrants living abroad could be tapped, not 
only, for example, through hometown associations but also through informal “diaspora 
knowledge networks” (BARRÉ et al. 2003), that is, networks of scientists and R&D personnel, 
business networks of innovative start-ups (cf. RAUCH 2001) and networks of professionals 
working for multinational companies (KUZNETSOV 2006). States, development agencies and 
international organizations try to support the circulatory mobility of persons engaged. The 
keyword is ‘temporary return’: Examples are UNESCO’s TOKTEN or IOM’s Migration and 
Development in Africa (MIDA) programs, which send migrants as experts back to countries 
of origin for short periods of time. And, of course, governments try to tap into the activities of 
hometown associations, although—seen only in terms of financial remittances—it is a small 
fraction, compared to remittances within kinship groups. A prominent example is the Mexican 
tres-por-uno (3x1) program, in which each ‘migradollar’ sent by migrants from abroad is 
complemented by three dollars from various governmental levels. More recently, banks have 
joined the fray and announced 4x1 programs. The examples given suggest that states and 
organizations have started to build programs on obligations and commitments felt by migrants 
towards home institutions. To use ALBERT HIRSCHMAN’s terms, soico-political loyalty is used 
after geographical exit to exert not economic and sometimes political voice (HIRSCHMAN 
1970). 
 
Much of the semantics focuses on community. The two most fashionable terms are ‘diaspora’ 
and ‘transnational communities’. There is an interesting difference: ‘diaspora’ is used 
frequently in the development discourse, ‘transnational communities’ in transnationalist 
literature. Both terminologies refer to “communities without propinquity” (FAIST 2000). Such 
 
communities are not primarily built upon geographical closeness but on a series of social and 
symbolic ties which connect ethnic, religious and professional diasporas. Yet the notions of 
diaspora and transnational community need to be unbundled and even rejected in order to get 
closer to a systematic analysis. ROGERS BRUBAKER cogently observed that the 
“universalization of the diaspora, paradoxically, means the disappearance of the diaspora” 
(BRUBAKER 2005: 3). In recent decades there has been a telling change of meaning. First, in 
the ‘classical’ meaning diaspora referred to forced migration and violent dispersal, nowadays 
it denotes any kind of migration, hence the talk of labour diaspora, trade diaspora, business 
diaspora, and refugee diasporas (COHEN 1997). Second, in the classical way diaspora implied 
a return to an imagined or real homeland, nowadays simply some sort of sustained ties back to 
the home country, and in post-modern usage even lateral ties—that is, ties not only from 
emigration to one immigration country but connectivity all over the globe. Third, in the old 
meaning diaspora referred to various forms of diaspora segregation in the immigration 
country, in the new meaning a sort of culturally pluralist boundary maintenance in the host 
country (e.g. GILROY 1993). While these are interesting shifts in meaning, the term 
diaspora—as well as transnational community—is too restrictive a term, which imagines a 
rather homogeneous cross-border social formation. It repeats the same mistake as much 
migration scholarship which assumes a rather homogenous national, ethnic or religious 
groupings. 
 
Transnational social formations and a systematic transnational approach is an alternative. 
Transnational formations—also: fields, spaces—consist of combinations of ties and their 
contents, positions in networks and organisations, and networks of organisations that cut 
across the borders of at least two national states. In other words, the term refers to sustained 
and continuous pluri-local transactions crossing state borders. There are various ways to 
conceptualize transnational social formations, which can be thought to be part of more general 
societal configurations. Two prominent ones are fields and spaces—the first one refers to the 
inner logic of social action and can be extended to systemic approaches, the second one to the 
spatial dimension of social life. A commonality is that they aim to overcome “methodological 
territorialism” (SCHOLTE 2000: 56), that is, conflating society, state and territory. And they 
are meant to overcome also the conflation of society, state and nation, “methodological 
nationalism” (WIMMER and GLICK SCHILLER 2003). 
 
The newest wave of the migration-development nexus raises a couple of challenges to 
transnational approaches. Here, I want to sketch three challenges. First, we definitely need to 
include migrant organisations and associations (cf. MOJA 2005), such as hometown 
associations. But we also need to look at the spaces in between associations, organisations and 
communities. Second, we can see a disjuncture between development studies on the one hand 
and migrant incorporation studies on the other hand, with the former emphasizing the South, 
and the latter being almost exclusively concerned with integration issues in the OCED-North. 
And third, while there has been some discussion on remittances alleviating poverty but 
strengthening overall inequality in emigration region, little attention has been devoted to the 
public policy mechanisms which could contribute to equality and social citizenship. 
 
(1) Methodological Rigour 
Most empirical studies on transnationalisation and development from a sociological or 
anthropological viewpoint focus on association and organizations, a line of research which 
needs to be continued (e.g. SMITH 2006). Such studies need to be complemented by those 
looking at the ‘spaces in between associations’, that is transactions criss-crossing multiple 
associations, networks forming within associations, and non-organized engagement. 
 
Methodologically, the exhortation of transnational approaches ‘follow the flow of persons, 
money, ideas and so forth’ has not really been taken very seriously, contrary to most 
announcements. A more systematic network approach, not only in the metaphorical sense is 
necessary. And there are models of how to do it. Taking multi-sited fieldwork seriously—that 
is, simultaneous research in locations—would mean to follow financial or other transactions 
in tracing lateral connectivities to other immigration and emigration regions. A case at hand is 
the five-year study by VALENTINA MAZZUCATO and her colleagues in tracing transactions 
involving persons, groups and organisations in the case of networks of Ghanaian migrants 
located in Amsterdam back to locations in Ghana and in other regions of the world 
(MAZZUCATO et al. 2007). Such a methodological approach does not presume concepts of 
world society which presuppose too much unity and systemic differentiation. In sum, 
exploring transnational connectivities through multi-sited fieldwork enables us to look at the 
great variety of societal forms. In particular, it allows us to trace the combination of a high 
degree of local clustering with a relatively low average path distance between nodes and hubs, 
which are located in different states. 
 
Networks can be built around various categorical distinctions, such as ethnicity, race, gender, 
schooling, professional training, political affiliation, and sexual preference. Ethnicity 
constitutes a particularly vexing issue in transnational studies. On the one hand a transnational 
approach should be able to overcome the ‘ethnic’ bias inherent in much migration 
scholarship. The fallacy is to label migrants immediately by ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’ categories. 
Often scholars presuppose prematurely that categories such as Turks, Brazilians and so forth 
matter a lot, since they do in public discourse. On the other hand, methods should be able to 
trace actually existing ethnic social formations, such as networks of reciprocity, which are of 
great importance, for example, in informal transfer systems of financial remittances. This 
means to turn the issue of the importance of ethnicity into an empirical question. 
 
Under-researched are also linkages between informal networks and formal organisations. 
Sometimes, for example, village associations celebrating cultural practices from the 
‘homeland’ change function: In the case of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia there are ‘old 
linkages, new networks’. Village associations (shetuan) also function as an arena for 
businesspersons planning to invest in certain parts of China (LIU 1998). While Overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs’ foremost considerations in deciding on China investment are 
profitability and economic opportunities available, it is in village associations that ties based 
on place of origin, kinship and dialect become useful as a foundation of establishing personal 
relationships (guanxi). Cultural affinities can facilitate effective personal and business 
relationships, and so do play an important part in directing a substantial amount of investment 
and charitable money to the People’s Republic of China (qiaoxiang). 
 
(2) Incorporation and Development 
So far, incorporation and development studies are disjointed, even in transnational studies. 
Studies either take the perspective of the country or region, in which immigrants live, and 
deal from a transnational angle with issues of incorporation into labour markets, housing, 
education and cultural pluralism, but also social security, state security, wage differentials, 
and so forth. Or studies deal with the effects of transnational ties on home countries, villages, 
formations from which migrants originate, such as demographic dynamics, remittance flows, 
and cultural impacts and often involving an analysis of transnational flows. The former 
studies, preoccupied with effects on immigration regions, have entered into a dialogue with 
assimilation and multiculturalism perspectives, and the latter, focusing on emigration regions, 
with development studies. Yet the two areas are awkward dance partners. For example, 
 
studies have found in the case of immigrants from Mexico, the Dominican Republic and 
Colombia in the USA that transnational immigrant organizations’ members are older, better-
established, and possess above-average levels of education (PORTES et al. 2007). This could 
be interpreted, depending on one’s conceptual predisposition, as transnationalism and 
assimilation not being opposites, or as a strong transnational orientation indicating a specific 
path of incorporation. 
 
However, if not carried onwards, such discussions miss the essence of a transnational 
approach, which is not only relevant for viewing incorporation in national terms. This is 
clearly visible in two-way flows. From an integrated North-South perspective one has to look 
not only at remittances but also at potential ‘reverse remittances’. There are indeed empirical 
findings of ‘reverse remittances’ or two way flows: They can be important especially at the 
beginning stages of migration of persons or groups, for example to help (undocumented) 
migrants to get papers and thus to legalize their stay. 
 
It is questionable whether terms such as immigrant integration or incorporation are able to 
capture how two-way flows shape associational life in between emigration and immigration 
regions. They are valid perspectives, of course, centring on regions of destination and origin. 
Nonetheless, the in-between transactions constitute social facts sui generis. Yet we have not 
yet found an appropriate terminology to deal with these social facts. Simply rejecting 
methodological nationalism is not enough. 
 
(3) Public Policy, Networks and Inequality 
Many studies look positively at remittances—financial, knowledge and social—because they 
may reduce poverty or even eradicate it and contribute to economic growth. However, there is 
almost no discussion of the mechanisms of how this may work—it is almost as if an ‘invisible 
hand’ would transform remittances into poverty reduction and economic growth. Needless to 
say, this is a very myopic view of the public policy relevance of remittances. If tying 
transnational migration to global social inequality, then remittances must be examined in their 
relevance for social policy. Seen in this way, they do not constitute explicit social policies, of 
course, but they form a basis for fostering social solidarity among citizens. This thought is not 
as farfetched as it may seem at first sight. Comparative historians of welfare states tell us that 
“late industrializers” in the sense of ALEXANDER GERSHENKRON, such as the Nordic countries 
and East Asia (WONG 2006), developed more universal social policies than “early 
industrializers” such as the United Kingdom. Yet, in the recent past targeted in contrast to 
universal social policies were the foundation of policies which international organisations 
favoured in the case of developing countries. Such policies failed miserably, in particular 
structural adjustment policies and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Therefore, 
the crucial policy question is how to fit remittances into universal social policies. How can 
remittances be factored into what a recent publication by the United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) calls “developmental welfare”? Social policy and 
social rights are not something that might merely evolve after a certain level of development 
has been reached. Rather “social policy is a key instrument for economic and social 
development” (UNRISD 2007: 2). Since there is no simple remittance-development-nexus, 
we need to look at policies which can forge social solidarity and are thus based on social 
citizenship. All great theorists of societal membership—from ARISTOTLE, CICERO, J.S. MILL, 
HANNAH ARENDT, T.H. MARSHALL—have agreed that in order to participate fully in public 
life, persons need to be in a certain socio-economic and political position—in MARSHALL’s 
tradition we may call it social citizenship; more recently the term “capabilities” has been 
introduced by AMARTYA SEN to capture the same thought (MARSHALL 1973, SEN 1999). 
 
 
In sum, there is, first, an interesting nexus between remittances, social policy and 
development with remittances constituting a sort of intervening variable because they are an 
expression of diffuse solidarity and generalized reciprocity upon which any kind of social 
policy has to be built. Second, only by integrating transnational migrants into policy circuits 
on various governance levels can such potentials be realized. Therefore, the uncritical 
celebration of diasporas and transnational communities in isolation from other agents by both 
neo-liberal and transnationalist-cum-communitarian views may be seriously misguided. At 
the very least, we need to analyse the social policy potential inherent in transnational with 
respect to state agencies on various levels, non-governmental organisations and economic 
organisations such as firms. 
 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, these introductory reflections represent a very preliminary overview of the issues 
involved. Occlusions and silences abound. For example, this overview has not discussed why 
the migration-development nexus and migrants as new transnational agents of development 
have been introduced now and how it fits into the changing paradigms and concepts of 
thinking on development. At least three topics are involved: first, the discursive constitution 
of the relationships between state vs. civil society & community and market vs. civil society; 
second, geopolitical changes since the end of the Cold War; and third, migration control as an 
implicit factor driving circulatory migration. Also, this sketch has barely mentioned the role 
of armed conflicts, civil wars and peace-building on political change. Also, we would need to 
discuss the different notions of development to be found among different categories of agents. 
Not only development experts are mobile and researchers who study migration and 
development—and looking around in this arena, obviously quite a few distinguished scholars 
belong to this circle—but also migrants themselves. And, perhaps most important of all, we 
need to analyze what one could call the symbolically highly charged numbers’ game, which 
characterizes development cooperation. For example, we may ask: What is the significance of 
repeating the statement that financial remittances are x-times higher than the sums allotted to 
official development aid (ODA)—considering the fact that ODA is not really regarded as 
really successful in overcoming social problems such as poverty? Does the repetition signal 
the continuation of a logic which cannot be repeated in the case of ODA, for all the obvious 
and known problems discussed for decades? Why would the mechanisms underlying 
‘development’ change all of a sudden if we substituted bearers of hope such as political elites 
or women with migrants? 
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